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1 Introduction
Since the mid 1980s, the U.S. economy has been characterized by a large and growing
trade deficit. Around the mid 1980s the deficit was about 3% of GDP while since 2000
has been on average about 5% of GDP. The phenomenon, given its magnitude, has
attracted a great deal of attention devoted to assessing the possible causes. Expansion-
ary fiscal policy is in the list. According to the standard textbook Mundell-Fleming
model, a fiscal policy expansion worsens the trade balance through the appreciation
of the nominal domestic currency following the inflow of foreign capital attracted by a
higher interest rate. If prices are sticky the exchange rate will appreciate also in real
terms.1
Quite surprisingly little evidence about the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the trade
deficit and the exchange rates is available.2 Existing empirical VAR analyses for the
US have provided, so far, results which are in sharp contrast with the above theoretical
predictions. Kim and Roubini (2008) Corsetti and Muller (2006), Monacelli and Perotti
(2007), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Enders, Muller and Scholl (2011)
find that the real exchange rate depreciates after an expansionary government spending
shock. Results for the trade balance are more mixed. Kim and Roubini (2008) find
that the trade balance improves while Monacelli and Perotti (2007) and Ravn, Schmidt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007) find that it worsens.3
The findings are so unconventional and puzzling that have sparked an important
research effort to better understand the mechanisms that propagate fiscal policy ac-
tions. Some authors have extended the standard models in order to account for such a
real depreciation of the domestic currency following a fiscal expansion. Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007) shows that with deep habits the increase in aggregate demand
triggered by government spending leads to a reduction of the domestic markup which
in turn makes the domestic economy less expensive, that is the real exchange rate de-
preciates. Corsetti and Muller (2011) shows that if the private sector expects spending
cuts in the future the real long term interest rate can fall producing a real depreciation
of the exchange rate as well as an improvement of the external balance.
Studying the effects of fiscal shocks using VAR techniques can be problematic
though. A few recent works have convincingly argued that, because of the existence of
legislative and implementation lags, private agents receive signals about future changes
1A partial list of models where a fiscal expansion may generate a worsening of the trade balance
includes Dornbusch (1976), Baxter, (1995) and Kollmann, (1998).
2On the contrary, a lot of works have been dedicated to study the effects of government spending
shocks on domestic variables; a partial list includes Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gali Lopez-Salido
and Valles (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Ramey and Shapiro (1988).
3Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen (2008) and Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen (2008) and Ben-
etrix and Lane (2009) find that for European countries the real exchange rate appreciates.
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in taxes and government spending before these changes take actually place, the phe-
nomenon called “fiscal foresight” (see e.g. Yang, 2007, Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2008,
Mertens and Ravn, 2010).
Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008) (LWY henceforth) shows theoretically, using a
closed-economy RBC model that, under fiscal foresight, standard VAR techniques are
likely to fail in correctly estimating the fiscal policy shock since a problem of non-
fundamentalness emerges. Non-fundamentalness typically arises when agents have a
larger information set than the econometrician (see Hansen and Sargent, 1980), a
situation that can occur when a limited number of variables are considered like in
VAR models, see Lippi and Reichilin (1994). But in presence of fiscal foresight non-
fundamentalness becomes a very likely scenario. The intuition is that fiscal variables,
like taxes or government spending, typically used to identify fiscal policy shocks, are
affected only with a delay by fiscal policy actions so that their current and past values
do not convey enough information about the current shock.
Forni and Gambetti (2010) provides empirical evidence that government spending
shocks are actually non-fundamental for the variables typically considered in standard
closed-economy specifications. The implication is that VAR models with these variables
are unable to consistently estimate the shock. The finding confirms the result obtained
in Ramey (2009) that the fiscal policy shock estimated with a VAR as in Perotti (2007)
is predicted by the forecast of government spending from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Although the specifications considered by these authors do not include
open economy variables, the results cast some doubt on the reliability of the findings
obtained with standard VAR techniques.
But there is also a second problem raised by the presence of fiscal anticipation.
Identification of the fiscal policy shock is typically achieved by imposing some restric-
tions on the impact effect of the fiscal policy variable. The well-known Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) identification, for instance, relies on the assumption that contemporane-
ously only government spending shocks have an effect on government spending. Kim
and Roubini (2008) identifies the shock by imposing an impact effect of deficit rather
than government spending. However all these identification schemes are in contrast
with the idea of delayed effects on fiscal variables. Rather under these identifications,
the fiscal shock should paradoxically be one of those labeled as non-policy.
This paper makes two contributions. First of all I investigate whether the govern-
ment spending shock estimated using the standard identification a` la Blanchard and
Perotti in an open-economy VAR is fundamental. It might be argued that the real ex-
change rate, due to its forward looking nature, could help in mitigating the problem of
non-fundamentalness arising in closed economy VARs. Here I show, using a simple the-
oretical example, that this is not true: fiscal foresight generates non-fundamentalness
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of the fiscal shock even in presence of the exchange rate. Moreover I check empiri-
cally for non-fundamentalness by testing whether the estimated shock is orthogonal to
the government spending forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the
Ramey’s (2011) variable.
The second contribution of the paper is to propose a new VAR identification pro-
cedure to identify government spending shock which delivers a fundamental shock.
Identification is based on a news variable defined as the revision of the long-term gov-
ernment spending forecast made by the professional forecasters. More specifically, the
revision is the difference between the forecast made at time t of government spending
growth between time t+2 up to t+4 and the forecast of the same variable made at time
t−1. Such a variable represents the new information about future government spending
that becomes available at time t to economic agents, proxied by the professional fore-
casters. The variable is ordered first in a Cholesky identification scheme and the first
shock is interpreted as the government spending shock. The identification procedure
has two key advantages. First, it incorporates all the information that agents use when
forming expectations about future spending so to alleviate the non-fundamentalness
problem. Second, government spending can react with delay to the shock, as implied
by fiscal foresight, and is not forced to increase on impact as in the standard Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) scheme.
The model is estimated using US quarterly data spanning from 1981:III to 2007:IV.
The baseline VAR includes the forecast revision variable, federal spending, the primary
deficit, GDP, the trade balance and the real exchange rate.
The main findings are the following. First, the government spending shock obtained
using the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification in the typical open-economy VAR
is predictable and hence non-fundamental. Second, using the new identification proce-
dure the real exchange rate appreciates, the trade balance worsens, and the long-term
real interest rate increases following a positive government spending shock. Moreover,
government spending reacts very slowly to the shock in line with the idea of fiscal an-
ticipation. Differences with the existing evidence are due to the fact that the shock
obtained using my identification procedure is fundamental. The results broadly match
the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model. Nonetheless the
effects on the trade balance are quantitatively small implying that fiscal policy should
not be considered one of the main causes of the large US external deficit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the problem
of nun-fundamentalness in open economy VARs; section 3 discusses the new identifica-
tion procedure; section 4 presents the results; section 5 presents some robustness check;
section 6 concludes.
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2 Non-fundamentalness and open economy variables
2.1 A simple theoretical example
In this subsection I consider a simple theoretical example to show the consequences
of fiscal foresight in presence of open economy variables like the exchange rate. One
might think that the exchange rate, because of its forward-looking nature can help in
mitigating the problems arising because of fiscal foresight in closed economy VARs.
Here I show that this is not true in general. On the contrary, even in presence of
this forward-looking variable fiscal foresight is likely to give rise to a problem of non-
fundamentalness.
The asset market view of exchange rate determination (see Mussa, 1984) assumes
that the logarithm of the exchange rate at time t, et, is determined by
et = Xt + aEt(et+1 − et)
where Et(.) denotes the expectation made at time t and Xt is a variable conveying the
economy fundamentals that affect the exchange rate at time t. The economy is assumed
to be driven by two exogenous processes: technology, θt , and government spending gt
characterized by one period of foresight. Specifically
θt = uθt
gt = ugt−1
where uθt is a white noise technology shock and ugt is a white noise spending shock.
The processes are assumed to be white noise for simplicity although the results can be
extended to more complicated cases. Therefore Xt = βθt + γgt = βuθt + γugt−1.
The MA representation of the three variables is
zt =
θtgt
et
 =
 0 1L 0
L(1+a)γ+aγ
(1+a)2
β
1+a
(ugt
uθt
)
= B(L)ut (1)
It easy to see that all the square sub-systems of (1) are non-fundamental. The MA
representation of θt and gt has a root equal to zero. The representation of θt and et has
a root equal to − a1+a . Finally the determinant of the representation of et and gt also
vanishes in zero. So ut = (uθt, ugt) is non-fundamental for any pair of the variables on
the left-hand side. So the exchange rate is not enough to make the system fundamental
despite its forward-looking nature.
Now let us see more in detail why standard VAR techniques are not successful to
correctly recover the shock in this case. Consider the bivariate model [gt et]
′. Its Wold
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representation is (
gt
et
)
=
(
1− α2α3α1α4 α2α4L
−α3α5α1α4L 1 + α5α4L
)(
η1t
η2t
)
(2)
where α1 = σg cos (λ), α2 = σg sin (λ), α3 = σg
γ
1+a cos (λ), α4 =
aγ
(1+a)2
sin (λ) +
σθ cos (λ), α5 = σg
γ
1+a sin (λ), λ = atan
(
σgaγ
σθ(1+a)2
)
. The Wold shocks are
(
η1t
η2t
)
=
 α1 [ δ1σg ugt−1 + δ2σθ uθt−1]
α3
[
δ1
σg
ugt−1 + δ2σθ uθt−1
]
+ α4
[
δ3
σg
ugt +
δ4
σθ
uθt
] (3)
where δ1 = δ4 = cos (λ), δ1 = δ3 = sin (λ) and σg and σθ are the standard deviations of
ugt and uθt respectively. It is easy to see that there is no linear combination of the Wold
innovations delivering the government spending shock ugt. This means that standard
identification techniques, which entail linear combinations of the Wold shocks, will fail.
In particular when applying the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification one obtains
the following Cholesky representation(
gt
et
)
=
(
α1 α2L
α3 α4 + α5L
)(
ξ1t
ξ2t
)
(4)
where the Cholesky shocks are(
ξ1t
ξ2t
)
=
(
δ1
σg
ugt−1 + δ2σθ uθt−1
δ3
σg
ugt +
δ4
σθ
uθt
)
(5)
Clearly ξ1t is not the government spending shock. Not only, the result has an important
implication which is worth noting. Under fiscal foresight, ξ1t is not orthogonal to Et−1gt.
The reason is that ξ1t depends on ugt−1.4 This means that the shock obtained with
a Cholesky identification within a VAR can be predicted by past expectations of the
government spending variable. This implication will be exploited later to empirically
check the existence of fiscal foresight.
There are two possible solutions to the non-fundamentalness problem. One is that
sed in Gambetti (2012) and entails the estimation of a factor model. A second strategy
is to use expectations of future spending. Indeed by replacing gt with Etgt+1 the
following subsystem is obtained(
Etgt+1
et
)
=
(
1 0
L(1+a)γ+aγ
(1+a)
β
1+a
)(
ugt
uθt
)
(6)
which is obviously fundamental. Note that with q periods of foresight the variable that
solves the non-fundamentalness problem is Etgt+q. In this paper we pursue this second
approach.
4With longer periods of foresight the shock will depend on longer lags of the expectations.
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2.2 Evidence
Here I revisit the existing evidence about the effects of government spending shocks on
the real exchange rate and the trade balance and check whether the estimated shocks
are fundamental.
I begin by running a VAR with the growth rate of federal spending, the growth
rate of GDP, the federal primary deficit , the trade balance (the last two expressed as
ratio to GDP and taken in differences), and the log of the real exchange rate.5 The
government spending shock is identified as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) as the first
shock in a Cholesky decomposition with federal spending ordered first.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions. The solid line is the point esti-
mate while the dotted lines represent the 68% confidence bands computed using the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998). In line with the existing evi-
dence6 the real exchange rate significantly depreciates by about 2% after one year.
On the other hand the trade balance significantly improves. Interestingly enough, I
find reversal in fiscal spending, as also found in Corsetti and Muller (2011), since the
response of federal spending changes sign after a few years.
Based on the considerations made in the previous subsection, I check for non-
fundamentalness arising from fiscal foresight by testing whether the identified shock
is predicted by the forecasts of government spending. If it is, the shock cannot be
fundamental.
I use the orthogonality test described in Forni and Gambetti (2010). The test is an
F-test of the null hypothesis that the shock is orthogonal to the q-th lag of the q-period
ahead forecast of government spending growth. The forecast variable is the forecast of
federal spending from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and q = 1, ..., 4. The null
hypothesis that the shock is orthogonal is rejected at 5% for q = 1, 3 and at 10% for
all the lags. The shock is non-fundamental.
As an additional check I also test for the orthogonality of the shock to the Ramey
(2011)’s military spending variable. The first row of Table 2 shows the p-values of the
F-test of the null hypothesis that the shock is orthogonal to the lags of the Ramey’s
variable up to two years, Rt−1 j = 1, ..., 8. The null is rejected only at 10% for the
seventh lag.
Finally, I check the robustness of the results to several VAR specifications listed in
Table 1. Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of government spending, the real
exchange rate and the trade balance to the government spending shocks identified as in
the baseline VAR. In the left column the responses estimated using 6-variable VARs are
5Similar results are obtained using all the variables in levels.
6See Kim and Roubini (2008) Corsetti and Muller (2006), Monacelli and Perotti (2007), Ravn,
Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Enders, Muller and Scholl (2011) .
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reported while the boxes in the right column depict those estimated using 7-variable
models. In all the specifications the responses are almost identical, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, to those obtained in the baseline VAR. The real exchange rate
depreciates and the trade balance improves.
For every specification I run the same test of orthogonality. The results are displayed
in columns 2 to 9 of Tables 2 and 3. Except for specification 4 and 6, where the null
of orthogonality is rejected at 10%, for all the remaining specifications orthogonality
to lagged forecasts is rejected at 5%. As far as the Ramey’s variable is concerned,
orthogonality is rejected at 10% for al the specificaion except the third one.
3 Identification based on forecast revisions
The results of the previous section support the existence of a problem of non-fundamentalness
arising from fiscal foresight. In other words, the information set of the typical VAR
is too poor. Moreover, the existence of fiscal anticipation suggests that the standard
identifying assumptions, a positive impact effect on government spending, are not ap-
propriate. My empirical strategy aims at solving both problems. The main idea is to
use the government spending forecasts made by economic agents. As shown in section
2.1 this should solve the non-fundamentalness problem because, in so doing, all the rel-
evant information is included in the information set.7 However instead of the forecast
itself I construct a news variable defined as the difference between the forecast at time
t and the forecast of the same variable at time t − 1. To get the intuition of why this
variable can be useful consider the following example. Suppose that the growth rate of
spending is an AR(1) with q periods of foresight
gt = φgt−1 + ugt−q.
It is easy to see that the difference between Etgt+q and Et−1gt+q, the expectation or
forecast revision, will deliver the shock
Etgt+q − Et−1gt+q = Etφgt+q−1 + ugt − Et−1φgt+q−1
= ugt.
In practice the identification is achieved as follows. Let gt be the logarithm of govern-
ment spending, gt+q|t the logarithm of the q-periods ahead forecast from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters given the information available at time t.8 I define the
7As usual in the VAR literature, we implicitly assume that economic agents can observe economic
shocks.
8I focus on forecasts of the growth rate because in the SPF dataset the forecast have different base
year the levels cannot be used.
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following two long run forecasts
f1t = gt+4|t − gt+1|t
f2t−1 = gt+4|t−1 − gt+1|t−1.
The variable to predict, the sum of the growth rate between time t+ 2 an t+ 4, is the
same in the two forecasts. What changes is the information set. Indeed f1t is made
using information up to time t while f2t is made using the information only up to time
t− 1. I define the forecast revision as the difference
rt = f
1
t − f2t−1. (7)
This variable represents the change in the long run forecast due to the new information
released at time t which was not available at time t − 1. A positive value of rt means
that professional forecasters learn, for instance a law is passed, that government spend-
ing will increase, not immediately, but in the future. Accordingly they update their
predictions. Indeed the variable has the interpretation of a news variable. I use the sum
of two to four periods ahead forecast since the exact number of periods of anticipation
is unknown but presumably fiscal policy actions take several quarters to materialize.
In principle one might want to use also longer horizons forecast but these forecast are
not available in the SPF. The forecast revision variable is ordered first in the VAR and
the government spending shock is the first in a Cholesky triangularization and the first
shock is interpreted as the government spending shock.
Ramey (2010) uses a similar variable, namely the difference between the growth
rates of government spending and the expected growth rate from the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters based on information available up to the previous period. In our
notation ∆gt− (gt|t−1− gt−1|t−1). This variable is ordered first and the first shock in a
Cholesky decomposition is interpreted as the government ending shock. A similar ap-
proach is used in Corsetti and Muller (2011). Here I prefer not to rely on this variable
because, under fiscal anticipation, such an innovation might not include the government
spending shock. In fact, going back to the example at the beginning of this section, if
gt = φgt−1 + ugt−q, it is easy to see that gt−Et−1gt = 0. This can seriously undermine
the interpretability of the shock as government spending shock so I prefer not to rely
on this variable.
There are two main advantages in using my identifying approach. First, it incorpo-
rates valuable information available to economic agents but presumably not conveyed in
fiscal variables and consequently omitted in standard specifications. Second, it leaves
the impact response of government spending completely unrestricted. In particular,
government spending can respond with several periods of delay as implied by fiscal
foresight. The identification scheme imposes that at time t, when the government
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spending shock arrives, forecasters update their forecasts expecting more spending in
the future.
The potential drawback of the identification strategy is that the innovation in the
forecast revision does not necessarily contain only exogenous government spending
shocks. In fact the revision might in principle change contemporaneously because of
predicted future increase in government spending reflecting change in systematic fiscal
policy. It is true that such policy actions should take even longer lags than discre-
tionary action, but this it is not granted a priori. Therefore in the robustness section I
propose an alternative identification scheme where the forecast revision is placed after
some variable which fiscal policy is likely to respond to and which are likely to react to
the shock with a lag.
4 Results
4.1 Data and baseline specification
I estimate a VAR with three lags for US quarterly data spanning from 1981:III to
2007:IV. The variables included in the baseline VAR are: the growth rate of real federal
government spending (Real Federal Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment);
the growth rates of real GDP, the federal primary deficit to GDP ratio, the trade
balance to GDP ratio, and the real exchange rate. The forecast revision variable (7) is
constructed using the (mean) forecast of the growth rate of federal government spending
form the Survey of Professional Forecasters available at the Philadelphia Fed website.
4.2 Informational content of the revision variable
First of all I check empirically that the news variable conveys useful information. To
this end I test whether it improves the forecast of government spending. More specifi-
cally I regress the growth rate of government spending on two lags of federal spending
growth, the growth rate of GDP, the federal primary deficit , the trade balance (the
last two expressed as ratio to GDP), the log of the real exchange rate, and the revision
variable, and I test whether the coefficients of the latter are zero. This corresponds
to a conditional Granger causality test which tells whether, conditional on the past of
the other variables, the variable under consideration adds valuable information. I use
the out-of-sample test used in Forni and Gambetti (2011) with an estimation period
of 75 quarters and two lags. The p-value of the test is 0.01. The revision variable
is important to predict federal spending. The result is different from that in Perotti
(2011) which finds that the forecast revision is largely driven by noise. In that paper
however the revision considered is that of the one period ahead forecast. Obviously, if
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there are several quarters of anticipation, as it is plausible to expect, the one period
ahead forecast revision will miss the spending shock. On the contrary the revision of
longer horizons forecast seems to convey valuable information.
4.3 The effects of government spending shocks
I start off by examining the series of the estimated shock, plotted in Figure 3. There
are three positive spikes in coincidence of the last three wars: the Gulf War, the War in
Afghanistan and the II Gulf War. For the last two episodes the peak exactly coincides
with the quarter in which the war officially starts. Moreover it is interesting to note
that there are two big negative spikes during the second half of the 80s, a period which
coincide with the end of the Reagan military build up and the end of the cold War.
The shock seems to capture quite well episodes of exogenous change in government
spending.
Figure 4 depicts the responses to the government spending shock identified as the
first shock in a Cholesky decomposition with the revision variable ordered first. The
solid line represents the point estimates while dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands
computed using the bootstrap-after-bootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998). The shock
affects government spending with a long delay, the effect becoming significant only
after one year. Moreover the response appears to be very sluggish, after about five
years spending has increased by about 1% and keeps climbing towards its new steady
state level. There is no evidence of spending reversal as found in the VAR without
forecast revision, where the response becomes negative after a few years. The response
of primary deficit has a similar shape: it starts around zero and increases very slowly.
The trade balance is unaffected on impact and deteriorates significantly after about
three quarters. After five years the shock worsens the balance by about 0.1%. The real
exchange rate appreciates by about 0.5% on impact and by 1.5% after about one year
when it reaches its maximal level. The response is significant at all the horizons and
shows a high degree of persistence. The results of section 2.2. are overturned with the
new identification.
From a qualitative point of view the results support the twin deficit view. Nonethe-
less, quantitatively the effects of the government spending turn out to be relatively
small, see Table 4. Government spending shocks explain about 7% and 3% of the
volatility of the the trade balance and deficit respectively. On the contrary the shock
seems to be more important fot the real exchange rate and the 10-year bond rate
explaining on average around 10-15% of the variance of the two variables.
From a theoretical point of view, the interest rate stands at the core of the trans-
mission of government spending. In the standard Mundell and Fleming model the real
exchange appreciates and the external balance deteriorates because of the inflow of
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foreign capital attracted by an increase of the domestic interest rate triggered by the
expansionary fiscal policy. On the empirical side however, the evidence about the ef-
fects of fiscal policy on interest rates is mixed.9 Here I investigate whether the response
of interest rates can explain the above results.
Figure 5 shows the response of real interest rates and inflation.10 The response
of inflation is significantly positive in the second and third quarter while insignificant
afterwards. Monetary policy appears to be largely unresponsive. The real federal funds
rate increases in the first year after the shock but the response is never significant.
On the contrary both the 1-year and the 10-year bond rates significantly increase in
the short run, by about 0.2% over the first year. The result is in line with Dai and
Philippon (2006) which finds a significant increase of the risk premia on long term
government bonds following a fiscal expansion that makes the yield curve steeper. The
result is consistent with the standard mechanism of real exchange rate appreciation
and external balance deterioration. The main findings of the paper lend broad support
to the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and other new
Keynesian DSGE models under conventional calibrations.
The results stand in sharp contrast with existing works where the effects of gov-
ernment spending socks are obtained using VAR models.11 In these papers the real
exchange rate is always found to depreciate. However they are in line with those ob-
tained in Erceg, Gust and Guerrieri (2005) where, using an estimated Neo-Keynesian
open economy DSGE model, the trade balance is found to deteriorate and the real
exchange rate to appreciate. Findings similar to mine for an anticipated government
spending shock are provided also in Taylor (1993). Finally Beetsma, Giuliodori and
Klaassen (2008) and Benetrix and Lane (2010) find an real appreciation for European
countries.
4.4 Explaining the differences
Why the results differ so much? I address this question by investigating whether the
shock obtained under my identification is fundamental. Specifically I apply the same
9Early works, including Plosser (1987) and Evans (1987), fail to find a significant relations between
fiscal interest rate and deficits. On the contrary, Elmendorf (1993) shows that when expectations of
future deficit, proxied by DRI forecasts, are considered then the above findings are overturned. Laubach
and(2005) and Gale and Orszag (2003) find significant effects of fiscal policy on the interest rates.
10The responses are obtained by estimating enlarged VAR models. Specifically I use five specifica-
tions. The first three specifications include the inflation rate and a real interest rate among the federal
funds rate, the 1-year and the 10-year bond rate. The fourth specification is the benchmark VAR plus
the spread between the 1-year bond rate and the federal fund rate, while the fifth is the benchmark
VAR plus the spread between the 10-year bond rate and the federal fund rate.
11See Kim and Roubini (2008) Corsetti and Muller (2006), Monacelli and Perotti (2007), Ravn,
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
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battery of tests used in section 2.2. Given that the shocks obtained under the two
identifications are very similar, I perform the test for the shocks obtained under the
baseline identification scheme.
Table 5 shows the p-values of the test of orthogonality to the lags of the forecasts of
government spending growth. The null is never rejected, the shock cannot be predicted
using past forecasts. Using the forecast revision variable seems to solve for the non-
fundamentalness problem arising from fiscal foresight. Table 6 also shows that the
shock is not predicted by past values of the Ramey’s (2010) variable.
As a last check of fundamentalness I apply the orthogonality test using the first
twelve principal components of the dataset used in Gambetti (2010). Specifically I
test whether the coefficients of Zt−j j = 1, ..., 4 where which is a vector containing
the first r = 1, ..., 2 components are significantly different from zero. The first column
reports the first principal components included in Zt. 3 for instance means that the first
three principal components are included in Zt. The null that the shock is orthogonal
to the lags of the principal components is always rejected at 5%. This last result is
particularly important since, by Proposition 4 of Forni and Gambetti (2011), it implies
that the shock is truly structural. This means that there is no need, as in principle
could be, of adding additional information and estimating for instance a factor model
or a FAVAR12.
Concluding, the shock is non-fundamental for the variables included in the standard
VAR specifications but becomes fundamental when the forecast revision variable is
used with the identification scheme discussed above. In other words, when the non-
fundamentalness problem is solved the results are overturned: the real exchange rate
appreciates and and the trade balance worsens.
5 Robustness
I make several checks to assess the robustness of the results.
First of all I change the identification strategy to control for a potential contempo-
raneous response of the news variable to other non-policy shocks. In this second scheme
the revision variable is ordered fifth, after GDP, spending, deficit and the trade balance
and before the real exchange rate. In so doing I allow other shocks to have contempora-
neous effects on the news. Figure 5 depicts the responses. Again the solid line represents
the point estimates while dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands computed using
the bootstrap-after-bootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998). Government spending, which
now starts at zero by assumption, increases very slowly showing insignificant effect for
the first quarters after the shock. The real exchange rate appreciates at all horizons
12For this reason I limit my analysis to VAR models
13
and the effects are always significant. The trade balance significantly worsens after a
zero impact effect. Deficit permanently and significantly reduces. Both from a quali-
tative and quantitative point of view results are very similar to those obtained in the
previous subsection. Figure 6 depicts the responses of inflation and interest rates under
the second identification.13 Again, the main results remain unchanged. The short term
interest rate increases in the short run but not significantly while the two long term
interest rate significantly increase in the short run reaching maximal level, around 0.2%
the 1-year bond rate, and 0.3% the 10-year rate. As in the baseline case the two spreads
raise. Figure 7 depicts the two shocks obtained under the two identification schemes.
The shocks are virtually identical. This explains why the results are so similar to those
obtained in the baseline case.
As a second check, I compute the impulse response functions (using the baseline
identification scheme) and perform the orthogonality test using other VAR specifica-
tions. The specification considered are those listed in Table 1 augmented with the
forecast revision. Figure 8 shows the point estimates of the impulse response functions
of government spending the real exchange rate an the trade balance. Results are very
similar to those obtained in the benchmark VAR. Moreover the null that the identified
shock is orthogonal is never rejected (see columns 2-9 of Table 4 and 5).
Third, I use two different revision variables. Specifically I use
(gt+4|t − gt+2|t)− (gt+4|t−1 − gt+2|t−1) (8)
and
(gt+4|t − gt+3|t)− (gt+4|t−1 − gt+3|t−1) (9)
Figure 9 shows the results of the three main aggregates in the baseline case (red solid
line) and the other two cases. There are some quantitative differences but the sign and
the shape of the response is largely unchanged confirming our earlier conclusions.
Fourth, I estimate the model using all the variables in levels to control for potential
cointegration relationships and apply the three identification procedures. Figure 11
show the responses obtained using the standard identification without revisions. The
trade balance significantly improves in the medium and long run while the real exchange
rate depreciates. Figure 10 shows the responses of obtained using the new identification.
The results are very similar to those obtained with the baseline VAR and all the main
conclusions are confirmed: the trade balance deteriorates and the domestic currency
appreciates in real term.
Finally I use the trade balance and the primary deficit expressed in real terms and
not as a ratios to nominal GDP. Results (not shown) are unchanged.
13Inflation is ordered before the revision variable while the interest rates are ordered after.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studied the effects of government spending policy shocks on the trade bal-
ance and the exchange rates. The shock is identified using procedure based on the
revisions of the forecast of the professional forecasters. The shock obtained, unlike
those obtained using standard VAR identification, is fundamental. The new identifica-
tion overturns existing results: after an expansionary government spending shocks the
trade balance deteriorates and the real exchange rate depreciates. The findings broadly
match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model. Nonetheless
the effects on the trade balance are quantitatively small implying that the fiscal spend-
ing shock should be considered quantitatively one of the main causes of the large US
external deficit observed over the last decades. We draw two main conclusions. First,
the standard open-economy transmission mechanism of government spending seems to
be consistent with the data and should not be dismissed. Second, problems arising
from fiscal anticipation should be carefully addressed when studying the effects of fiscal
policy with empirical models.
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Tables
Specification Variables
1 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER
2 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Investment
3 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Consumption
4 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, CPI
5 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Fed. Funds Rate
6 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, CPI; Fed. Funds Rate
7 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Investment; Consumption
8 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Consumption; CPI
9 Gov. Spend.; GDP; Deficit; Trade Bal.; RER, Consumption; Fed. Funds Rate
Tabe 1: VAR speficifications.
VAR Survey of Professional Forecsters
specification Et−1∆gt Et−2∆gt Et−3∆gt Et−4∆gt
1 (benchmark) 0.0466 0.0521 0.0315 0.0594
2 0.0488 0.0566 0.0424 0.0749
3 0.0386 0.0540 0.0362 0.0717
4 0.0693 0.0714 0.0568 0.0859
5 0.0540 0.0687 0.0394 0.0660
6 0.1043 0.1205 0.0858 0.1134
7 0.0395 0.0655 0.0674 0.1189
8 0.0460 0.0627 0.0496 0.0733
9 0.0390 0.0621 0.0371 0.0715
Table 2: p-values of the F-test of the null hypotesis that the shock is orthogonal to Et−j∆gt,
j = 1, ..., 4 where ∆gt if the growth rate of the federal spending. In the first colum there apear
the VAR specification used to estimate the shock. The first one is the benchmark VAR.
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VAR Ramey’s variable (R)
specification Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Rt−5 Rt−6 Rt−7 Rt−8
1 (benchmark) 0.5932 0.7773 0.6195 0.5552 0.9959 0.6433 0.0858 0.2662
2 0.6800 0.8022 0.7073 0.6093 0.9868 0.6364 0.0535 0.1869
3 0.7097 0.7001 0.7016 0.5319 0.8678 0.9716 0.1130 0.3305
4 0.5080 0.9766 0.8326 0.8062 0.7329 0.7986 0.0544 0.2176
5 0.5847 0.8270 0.7358 0.6351 0.8813 0.5971 0.0742 0.1987
6 0.6387 0.8925 0.8694 0.7832 0.7644 0.6189 0.0547 0.1985
7 0.9037 0.7027 0.6941 0.5377 0.9041 0.9623 0.0623 0.2582
8 0.5399 0.7652 0.8676 0.7455 0.6200 0.9126 0.0941 0.2505
9 0.6571 0.7729 0.8607 0.6036 0.7625 0.9773 0.0730 0.2596
Table 3: p-values of the F-test of the null hypotesis that the shock is orthogonal to the Ramey’s
variable Rt−j , j = 1, ..., 8 In the first colum there apear the VAR specification used to estimate
the shock. The first one is the benchmark VAR.
Variable: Horizon (quarters)
0 5 9 20
Expectation Revision 100.00 87.45 86.50 86.43
Federal spending 1.94 3.93 9.65 16.64
GDP 1.88 4.28 4.79 5.64
Primary Deficit 0.60 1.34 1.86 3.82
Trade Balance 0.03 3.21 5.06 7.62
Real Exchange Rate 1.28 9.83 11.94 12.95
Inflation 0.90 4.97 5.19 5.56
Real Federal Funds Rate 0.17 1.09 0.58 1.31
Real 1Y Rate 5.20 6.31 5.19 3.65
Real 10Y Rate 13.83 20.11 20.00 17.52
Spread 1Y-FFR 2.50 2.07 2.49 2.47
Spread 10Y-FFR 4.14 2.89 3.97 4.21
Table 4: percentage of forecast error vriance explained by the hock at different horizons.
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VAR Survey of Professional Forecsters
specification Et−1∆gt Et−2∆gt Et−3∆gt Et−4∆gt
1 (benchmark) 0.6139 0.7950 0.8151 0.7825
2 0.6290 0.8160 0.8761 0.8389
3 0.7600 0.8855 0.9743 0.9259
4 0.5114 0.7115 0.6709 0.7017
5 0.4618 0.7175 0.6668 0.5962
6 0.4826 0.7633 0.6930 0.6984
7 0.8116 0.9445 0.8709 0.7534
8 0.5940 0.7500 0.7649 0.9353
9 0.5661 0.8032 0.8166 0.8607
Table 5: p-values of the F-test of the null hypotesis that the shock is orthogonal to Et−j∆gt,
j = 1, ..., 4 where ∆gt if the growth rate of the federal spending. In the first colum there
appear the VAR specification used to estimate the shock. All the specifications include the
expectations revision variable.The first one is the benchmark VAR.
VAR Ramey’s variable (R)
specification Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Rt−5 Rt−6 Rt−7 Rt−8
1 (benchmark) 0.3053 0.4150 0.9003 0.3140 0.7897 0.1471 0.2267 0.5453
2 0.3393 0.3634 0.8809 0.3582 0.7932 0.1216 0.2332 0.4861
3 0.2569 0.2876 0.9089 0.3026 0.9361 0.3319 0.1301 0.7855
4 0.3579 0.3409 0.7419 0.4589 0.9960 0.1098 0.2982 0.6184
5 0.3667 0.3111 0.7110 0.5390 0.9729 0.0732 0.2226 0.6444
6 0.4104 0.4381 0.7835 0.5215 0.9698 0.0912 0.2601 0.7002
7 0.3562 0.2123 0.8369 0.4047 0.9048 0.2778 0.1264 0.7207
8 0.3368 0.1805 0.5884 0.5769 0.6149 0.2475 0.1796 0.8504
9 0.3142 0.2339 0.8179 0.5333 0.7710 0.2265 0.0748 0.8422
Table 6: p-values of the F-test of the null hypotesis that the shock is orthogonal to the Ramey’s
variable Rt − j , j = 1, ..., 8 In the first colum there apear the VAR specifications used to
estimate the shock. All the specifications include the expectations revision variable. The first
one is the benchmark VAR.
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Number of Lags of Zt
principal components
in Zt Zt−1 Zt−2 Zt−3 Zt−4
1 0.5363 0.7777 0.8706 0.3796
2 0.5042 0.6101 0.6723 0.0600
3 0.6942 0.7358 0.7756 0.1321
4 0.7292 0.8037 0.8942 0.2318
5 0.8132 0.8977 0.8791 0.1802
6 0.8961 0.9434 0.9139 0.2409
7 0.9247 0.9484 0.8911 0.2452
8 0.9608 0.9164 0.6668 0.3012
9 0.9807 0.9133 0.1877 0.2064
10 0.9895 0.7752 0.2460 0.2273
11 0.9753 0.7005 0.1470 0.2939
12 0.9298 0.7656 0.2025 0.3147
Table 7: p-values of the F-test of the null hypotesis that the shock is orthogonal to the vector
Zt−j including the firs k principalcomponents, j = 1, ..., 4 and k = 1, ..., 12. In the first column
there appear the number of principalcomponents included in Zt.
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Figures
Figure 1: impulse response function of the benchmark VAR. Solid lines are point esti-
mate, dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 2: impulse response functions for other VAR specifications listed in Table .
6-Variable specifications: dotted line - specification 2; light solid line - specification
3; solid line - specification 4; dashed line - specification 5; solid line - specification 5.
7-Variable specifications: solid line - specification 6; dashed line - specification 7; light
solid line - specification 8; dotted line - specification 8 .
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Figure 3: estimated government spending shock.
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Figure 4: impulse response function of the benchmark VAR augmented with the forecast
revisions. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands.
26
Figure 5: impulse response function of the benchmark VAR augmented with the forecast
revisions. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands.
27
Figure 6: impulse response function of the VAR augmented with the forecast revisions
under the alternative identification scheme. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines
are the 68% confidence bands.
28
Figure 7: impulse response function of the VAR augmented with the forecast revisions
under the alternative identification scheme. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines
are the 68% confidence bands.
29
Figure 8: estimated government spending shocks in the two identifications.
30
Figure 9: impulse response functions for other VAR specifications listed in Table 1. All
the specifications are augmented with the forecast revision. 7-Variable specifications:
dotted line - specification 2; light solid line - specification 3; solid line - specification
4; dashed line - specification 5; solid line - specification 5. 8-Variable specifications:
solid line - specification 6; dashed line - specification 7; light solid line - specification 8;
dotted line - specification 8.
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Figure 10: impulse response functions using different forecast revisions. Solid line- with
the benchmark variable; doted line - with (8); dashed line - with (9).
32
Figure 11: impulse response function in the levels specfication. Solid lines are point
estimate, dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands.
33
Figure 12: impulse response function in the levels specfication with the forecast revision
variable. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines are the 68% confidence bands.
34
Figure 13: impulse response function in the levels specfication with the forecast revision
variable and the alternative identification. Solid lines are point estimate, dotted lines
are the 68% confidence bands.
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